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Abstract 
We use CDC microdata on cause of death and CPS data on populations by age to create suicide rates for 
five-year age groups at five-year intervals, further cross-classified by race/ethnicity, education, and 
marital status. We examine the suicide history 1990-2010 of U.S. birth cohorts, net of age and cohort 
linear trends. These de-trended cohort deviations follow familiar patterns: most pronounced in the Baby 
Boom, least pronounced during the Baby Bust, they illustrate the so-called Easterlin effect. Suicide rates 
for women show similar patterns as suicide patterns for men. We show persistence of those effects net of 
micro factors (especially education and marriage) implicated in suicide behavior and correlated at the 
macro level with relative cohort size. Analysis of suicide patterns over time for high- and low-educated 
men and women shows that white men with low education face a sharp increase, significantly above the 
linear time trends, in suicide rates among cohorts born between 1955 and 1970. This bump is mostly 
unrelated to secular trends of increasing average educational attainment rates, at least if no interaction 
between age and cohort is involved in the explanation. No obvious pattern related to cohort size is found 
for African-American high- and low-educated men, which makes sense given the very different historical 
dynamics for this minority sub-population. 
 
Background 
Suicide is generally associated with a combination of privations; life reversals (including loss of social 
status, income, and employment; plus divorce); despair and loss of hope, aspirations and positive 
expectations about the future; and a lack of social integration that might otherwise temper the various 
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combinations of the other factors.  Durkheim argued that both integration (the context of deep social 
embeddedness) and regulation (the capacity of individuals to maintain a correct, positive balance between 
realities and expectations) prevent suicides. In both sociology and epidemiology, an enduring question 
has been, How is it that the most extraordinary of individual behaviors can be best evidenced by factors 
that are potentially supra-individual? On a population level, suicide rates may increase if economic 
conditions are bad or rapidly decreasing (Phillips & Nugent 2014). Suicide rates can be partly explained 
by individual-level factors such as family size (Denney et al. 2009; Denney 2010), but have in studies 
with aggregate data also been shown to respond to period and cohort effects and other contextual factors 
(Pampel 1996; Pampel & Peters 1995; Stockard and O’Brien 2002a; 2002b; 2006). One contextual-level 
factor influencing suicide rates is the size of the birth cohort into which one is born, providing or 
depriving opportunities to succeed in realizing one’s expectations. This effect of size of birth cohort has 
been coined the Easterlin effect (Easterlin 1980), referring to the hypothesis that individuals born into 
larger birth cohorts fare worse than individuals born into smaller birth cohorts. A larger birth cohort may 
render jobs in short supply relative to the cohort’s needs, diminish or cloud economic prospects, 
exacerbate competition, and make upward social mobility less likely and downward social mobility more 
of a threat.  
We describe suicide trends between 1990 and 2010 for men and women, adjusting for individual 
sociodemographic characteristics. We test the extent to which the Easterlin effect holds for suicide 
mortality for the United States, especially after adjustment for micro level correlates of suicide, and 
consider how and why, among birth cohorts, the propensity toward suicide operates differentially. We 
take advantage of information on individual-level variables to examine suicide patterns separately for 
gender, race, and educational level (university diploma and above versus completed high school and 
below), with a focus on middle-aged white men with low education, giving some further structure to the 
observations of Case and Deaton (2015), that rising morbidity and mortality levels specifically reflect a 
cohort effect. More precisely, this frustrated social generation hypothesis1 is rapidly presented and not 
demonstrated by the authors; additionally, they mention an increasing educational gradient they do not 
consider further2. Our aim here is to fill these gaps: we deepen the cohort-based diagnosis and analyze 
how the educational gradient of suicide is related to birth cohort dynamics.  
                                                     
1 “After the productivity slowdown in the early 1970s, and with widening income inequality, many of the baby-
boom generation are the first to find, in midlife, that they will not be better off than were their parents.” (p.5) 
2 “The final rows of <table 1> show increasing educational gradients from 1999 and 2013” (p.3) 
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Data 
Data on suicide come from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Mortality Multiple 
Cause Files.3 This annual micro dataset contains information annually on approximately two million 
decedents, including age, cause of death, and important socioeconomic descriptors. We examine the  
N=130,479 suicides for five-year age groups for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. We 
distinguish male and female suicides, not only because of well-known differences in suicidal behavior 
(suicides are approximatively fourfold more common among men, despite more failed suicide attempts in 
women) but also because of gender-specific differences in labor force engagement and attachment (a 
crucial factor in the theory of the Easterlin effect) that narrowed across the cohorts represented in this 
study. For these male and female decedents we observe their contemporaneous level of education, a 
measure of relative social status and perhaps permanent income; race/ethnicity (white/African-
American/other/Hispanic); and marital status (single/married/widowed/divorced or separated). 
To construct a reference population at risk of suicide, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the 
respective year.4  For the five years corresponding to the CDC death data we obtain counts of the 
population for five-year age groups cross-classified by education, race/ethnicity, and marital status. 
Because the CPS reports level of education in terms of diplomas whereas Vital Statistics uses years of 
schooling, we employ a four-category schema—less than high school graduate; high school graduate 
(including GED); some college; and college graduate and beyond—that is relatively unambiguous with 
respect to both data sources. The CPS reference population consists of 1,600,481 cases, before application 
of extrapolation weights. We match the two micro datasets (deaths and population at risk) to compute 
suicide rates by age over time, cross-classified by the individual-specific sociodemographic factors.  
Counts of the observed population can be blended with death information and common demographic life-
table assumptions to create estimates of person-years at risk.  Alternatively, individuals dying due to 
suicide can be subtracted from similar estimates of beginning-year populations at risk to create an 
aggregated cross-classification of micro data: suicide (or not) × year × age × education × race/ethnicity × 
marital statistics.  This allows computation of probabilities or odds.  In practice, with the incidence of 
suicide being low, and intervals of observation short (a year), logs of rates, probabilities, and odds are all 
but indistinguishable from one another. 
Method 
Consider a generalized equation of the form 
                                                     
3 Vital Statistics Data Available Online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data_access/Vitalstatsonline.htm 
4 Available at cps.ipums.org.   
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ln 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 = ln 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝛿
𝐴𝐴𝑖 + 𝛿
𝑃𝑃𝑗 + 𝛿
𝐶𝐶𝑘, 
a representation of a Poisson model for rates (the denominator 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 being fixed by design), where—to 
simplify the exposition—notation for sociodemographic characteristics (and corresponding parameters) 
have been suppressed. The 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑗, and 𝛾𝑘 are the familiar fixed effects for the I ages, J periods (years), 
and K=I+J-1 cohorts represented in the rectangular A×P design. The 𝐴𝑖, 𝑃𝑗, and 𝐶𝑘 are vector 
transformations of the indexes i, j, and k (see Holford 1983 or Chauvel & Schroeder 2014 for alternative 
linear transformations). If we ignore the terms 𝛿𝐴, 𝛿𝑃, and 𝛿𝐶, it is well known that even with the effect 
normalization 
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
= ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
= 0 
the model is under-identified, due to the fundamental linear combination A=P-C (e.g., Fienberg 2013). 
The alternative way of thinking about this is that only two of the three linear terms 𝛿𝐴, 𝛿𝑃, and 𝛿𝐶 are 
identified; but that once a decision is made on that front, the further constraints 
 𝐺 𝐴 ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛿
𝐴,     𝐺𝑃 ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑃𝑗 = 𝛿
𝑃,     and     𝐺𝐶 ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑘 = 𝛿
𝐶, 
do identify the 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑗, and 𝛾𝑘 parameters, not as effects of age, period, and cohort per se, but as deviations 
from a two-dimensional plane in time. (The 𝐺∗ terms are normalizing scalars depending on the linear 
transformation of the indexes). A restriction on one of the linear components of age, period, and cohort is 
in no sense a general solution to the fundamental problem of identification of so-called cohort effects in 
data cross-classified by age and time. Rather, it is an identification that accords with our particular 
conceptualization of cohort effects, as deviations from a general time trend. We define that baseline trend 
as the linear trend in age and cohort. We hence set 𝛿𝑃 = 0, as per Holford’s (1983) original identification, 
which has been taken up by O’Brien (e.g., 2014) as the (period) zero linear trend (ZLT) model and by 
Chauvel & Schroeder (2014) as the APC-Detrended approach (APCD). Our analysis under this model 
emphasizes cohort contrasts where more advantaged birth cohort are systematically above the linear age-
period-cohort trend compared with the comparably disadvantaged birth cohorts below the trend. Chauvel 
& Schroeder (2014, 2015) provide a more detailed substantive motivation for this focus. 
The general model (so conceptualized and identified) can be used with either aggregated data on rates (a 
Poisson error specification and a log link) or with a micro motivated (binary error, logit or probit link) 
specification—not that the distinction matters much computationally in these data (see comments in prior 
section).  It can be extended to including individuals’ characteristics, specifically education, marital 
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status, and race/ethnicity. We thus test whether fluctuations in suicide by cohort are due to changes in 
cohort composition with respect to these measured demographic characteristics (known to be correlated at 
the micro level with suicide) or whether they represent more “intrinsic” cohort characteristics, such as the 
(mis)fortune represented by (relatively larger) cohort size.  
Results 
APCD logit models were run without control variates, then with education, marital status and race as 
covariates for men (Table 1) and women (Table 2). Being married and better educated were protective 
with respect to the risk of suicide, whereas being white was positively associated with risk of suicide. 
 
Figure 1.  Cohort fluctuation for suicide by birth cohort with and without controls, males and females. 
 
Figure 1 shows the cohort fluctuations in suicide rates for both men and women, without control variates 
(left hand side) and with control variates (right hand side). For men, the 1940 cohort has a -10 % reduced 
risk, whereas the 1960 cohort faces a +10 % increased risk of dying of suicide, relative to the linear trend 
in age and cohort. The control variables (see Tables 1 and 2) confirm what we know from Durkheim 
(1897) and his followers about suicide: marriage is protective. Although there is no doubt that, on 
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average, so-called white Americans have more of the good things in life, they are also at higher risk of 
suicide, due (in the traditional Durkheimian interpretation) to lower levels of regulation. Education, 
however, has a protective role, and white Americans have on average more education. But the relative 
density of whiteness, and/or education, is changing only slowly across cohorts, and largely in a linear 
fashion, which is not what we are looking at with these cohort coefficients. When controls are included in 
the APCD model, the profile of cohort fluctuation remains almost unchanged, except for a slight 
reconfiguration of the relative rates of the peak suicide cohorts among males: without micro level 
controls, the apparent peak is for the cohorts circa 1965; whereas with controls the peak occurs for the 
circa 1955 birth cohorts, with a gradual fall-off (not rise) during the next decade of births. These are 
minor variations on the overall theme.  
Plotting the APCD coefficients for cohort deviations from trend in rates of suicide against the APCD 
coefficient of size of birth cohort reveals a strong positive correlation of size of birth cohort and suicide 
rates per cohort for both genders (Figure 2). Specifically, in our reference population sample from CPS, 
we generate logN, the logged (extrapolation weighted) sample in each cell of the A×P table, and extract 
the cohort APCD vector which represents the relative detrended size of the cohort. We correlate these 
cohort coefficients with those previously obtained for the APCD model for suicide rates (Tables 1 and 2). 
The R2 of this correlation suggests that, for men, a total of 79 % of the variance in suicide rates can be 
explained by the relative size of the birth cohort (upper panel of Figure 2). For women, associations of 
birth cohort size and suicide fluctuation are smaller—as should be expected given their lower implication 
in the labor force, particularly in the birth cohorts represented here—but show the same pattern as size of 
birth cohort contributes almost largely to the variance in suicide fluctuations (R2 = 72 %; lower panel of 
Figure 2). Models were also run including both individual-level variables and contextual-level size of 
birth cohort. As expected given the strong correlations observed in Figure 2, the explanatory contribution 
of size of birth cohort absorbed almost all the effect of cohort contrasts. 
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Figure 2. Associations of birth cohort size and suicide rates for men (upper graph) and women (lower 
graph) after controls. 
The covariates added to the general APCD model assume that the “effects” of each demographic or 
socioeconomic variable are additive, just as the basic model does itself with the canonical terms age, 
period, and cohort since, for example, the only interactions of age and period are assumed to be captured 
in one specific linear combination, cohort. We now consider various interactions, in the sense of age 
patterns that vary by combinations of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as well as 
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interactions between the canonical time measures that are not captured in the definition of cohort. Suicide 
rates (per 100,000) for different age groups in different survey years (1990-2010) are plotted in Figure 3 
by gender and education (high [some college or above] versus low [no college]) for whites, and by 
education for African-American men. Any two dimensional rendering of rates (in this case age within 
periods) risks conflating period and cohort effects, mis-estimating age patterns—it has ever been thus! 
We take the risk nonetheless, since identification of these “layered” interactions has potential to add to 
our understanding of this historical social process. 
For white men (certainly the better-educated white men), white women, and African-American men with 
high education, no clear patterns of suicide by age are observed in the cross-section (i.e., within periods, 
specific years of observation). For low-educated African-American men (lower right-hand panel of Figure 
3), suicide rates are highest in the 20s then diminish continuously with age. There is one group with a 
dramatic bump in suicide rates: white low-educated men born around 1960 face a large increase in suicide 
rates. This increase is restricted to the time when this cohort enters middle age, as it is only visible above 
age group 40, no clear pattern being observable below (lower-left panel of Figure 3; lower left hand side). 
This represents a cohort-age or period-age interaction not specified in the additive APCD model. Net of 
longer term trends in expectations for well-being, the recent economic crisis—which we pick up in these 
data for the year 2010—was experienced especially badly (insofar as suicide is an indicator) by lower-
educated men of middle age. Presumably they were at an age with responsibilities if not unmet 
expectations, little time, and fewer resources to cope. For women, suicide rates are lower, so deviations 
are less pronounced, but there is also evidence of a parallel bump for those with lower education among 
the cohorts reaching middle age in 2010 (middle panel of lower tier of Figure 3; translated into logs, the 
bumps for white men and women are similar in intensity). In contrast, the African-American population, 
which has a long history of exclusion and poverty, and quite a bit of experience with coping with 
challenges, prejudices, and thwarted ambitions does not seem to have been affected in the same way as 
the white less-educated population. The latter group has recently experienced an acceleration in a sense of 
loss, of a prior relatively secure (if not dominant) social and economic status, as per the 1960s model of 
middle-class America. We infer that that diminished opportunities for training and upward social mobility 
at that age contribute to increases in despair and gaps between aspirations and realities, resulting in 
increased population-level suicide rates.  
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Figure 3. Suicide rates (per 100,000), age and education 1990-2010 in groups of the American 
population: men, women (both not separated by race), and African American men separate for high 
education and low education. Black thick lines = 1990, dark grey thick lines = 2010; dashed, dotted and 
short dashed lines represent 1995, 2000 and 2005 respectively. 
What of Durkheim’s theory, that the lack of social integration is main contributor to the risk of suicide? 
The group most vulnerable to social stress identified in our analyses is white low-educated men. 
Comparing the suicide fluctuations for married versus non-married high-educated versus low-educated 
men (Figure 4), we clearly see that the vulnerable group of white low-educated men is at dramatically 
higher risks of dying of suicide if not socially protected by marriage (rates above 100 suicides per 
100,000 residents for the 2010 survey). Although higher educated non-married white men do have higher 
rates of suicide than similar men who are married, the relative risk of dying of suicide associated with 
marital status is substantially higher for low-educated white males. Education, or social status, is in part a 
substitute for social integration or, to turn it around slightly, in the absence of high(er) educational status, 
the absence of a spouse makes men especially prey to suicide.  
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Figure 4. Suicide rates (for 100,000), age, education and marital status 1990-2010 in groups of the 
American white male population, separate for married (right hand side) versus non-married (left hand 
side) and high education (associate university diploma and above, upper graphs) versus low education 
(completed high school and below, lower graphs). Black thick lines = 1990, dark grey thick lines = 2010; 
dashed, dotted and short dashed lines represent 1995, 2000 and 2005 respectively. 
Finally, consider the relative contribution of size of birth cohort (It’s the demography, stupid! Easterlin, 
1987) and educational expansion (It’s the education, stupid! Dowd & Hamoudi, 2014) to explaining 
fluctuations in suicide rates. Regressing suicide rates on indicators of cohorts population size (from CPS 
calculated as APC-D cohort coefficients of the logarithm of the population size per period and age cell) 
and educational average attainment (calculated as APC-D cohort coefficients of the logit model of 
probability to be associate university diploma or above per period and age cell), we find that population 
size explains the preponderance of cohort deviations in suicide rates (R2= 55% with cohort size, 89 % if 
cohort size is lagged by five years; see Figure 5), whereas educational attainment only marginally 
contributes further. We generated several alternatives for the cohort nonlinearities of education. The one 
we retain here is based on the CPS based cohort APCD vector in a logit specification for some college or 
above versus high school graduate or below. When suicide APCD is correlated with education (after 
adjusting for cohort size), it simply adds 2 % to the overall R2 with no lag, and 22% with a lag of five 
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years of education. In a multiple linear regression of suicide APCD coefficients on those of education and 
of cohort size, the role of education is not significant. Education might matter, but it is largely by way of 
conditioning the effects of social integration (marriage), in particular among the white population. Cohort 
trends are more likely Easterlin effects, as Figure 6 makes clear5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the association of suicide rates and cohort size, adjusting for educational 
expansion, for the whole population, using concurrent cohort size (left panel) and five-year lagged cohort 
size (right panel). 
 
                                                     
5 We tried a third type of explanation: “It’s the economy, stupid!”, with a third APCD detrended vector based on 
poverty variable. To generate this, we compute in the CPS the median family income equivalized by the square root 
of the household size and define relative poverty threshold as half of the median. This poverty dimension is very 
well (negatively) correlated with education (R=-.86) but poorly with suicide (R=-0.07). When poverty is introduced 
in the regression of suicide on population size and education, the adjusted R2 declines; the variance inflation factor 
VIF diagnoses a strong collinearity of poverty with the other regressors (at first: education). We consequently avoid 
this economic perspective on suicides.  
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Figure 6. Suicide rates, educational expansion and cohort size APC-D standardized cohort coefficients 
(male population). 
 
Discussion 
Our analysis demonstrates that size of birth cohort is associated with risk of dying of suicide with data of 
the United States at the time between 1990 and 2010. As the overall explained variance suggests, size of 
birth cohort is actually the main driver of suicide rates, which has been coined the Easterlin effect earlier 
(Pampel & Peters 1995). Suicide is but one of the many symptoms of lack of social integration and 
regulation that is caused by large birth cohorts leading to overcrowding and competition for scarce 
resources. Recent evidence suggests that homicide (O’Brien & Stockard 2002; 2006) and homelessness 
(Sharygin, Smith et al., in preparation) are also strongly affected by the size of birth cohort.  
Suicide fluctuations reveal little gender differences, with persistence of cohort effects for both genders 
even after controlling for important micro-level indicators of social status (education) and social 
integration (marital status). Despite the incidence of suicide being smaller for the female population, 
similar effects seem to operate here, and we find pronounced associations of suicide rates with size of 
birth cohort for both genders.  
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Regarding associations of educational attainment with the availability of opportunities, aspirations and 
associated (lower) suicide rates, one may argue that higher education could help in the competition for 
scarce resources in large birth cohorts, as education is an essential prerequisite for upward social mobility 
and increasing life chances. Consequently, lower-educated members of those cohorts may be at even 
higher risk for bad outcomes in terms of employment and status. However, this suggestion of members of 
large birth cohorts being even more dependent on educational resources is not supported by our data. 
Further, changes in stratification of general mortality (e.g. Olshansky et al. 2012) have often been 
explained with a changing meaning of education associated with secular trends of increasing educational 
attainment across time (i.e. those low educated after educational reforms are characterized by higher 
disadvantage compared to earlier-born cohorts who could not benefit from educational expansions, e.g. 
Dowd & Hamoudi 2014). However, this possible changed meaning of education associated with secular 
educational expansion trends is not reflected in our findings. Rather, what we find is a dramatic increase 
in suicide rates specifically for the circa-1960-born white low-educated men at the time they enter middle 
age. This finding reflects a composite of (a) particular levels of social stress related with the economic 
crisis and (b) a particular vulnerability of the life stage above middle age, presumably reflecting objective 
diminished opportunities for training and development for those cohort members after reaching middle 
age who may at this point realize that they will be constantly deprived of opportunities for social upward 
mobility still possible for younger age groups.  
This confirms Easterlin’s (1980) original predictions, but our micro-data based research shows that only 
some segments of the baby boom generation have been affected: the mechanism seems to play out mainly 
if not only in lower-educated whites. African-Americans may, by dint of a constant exposure to 
discrimination and precarity that dwarfs the demographically-induced social and economic fluctuations to 
which the dominant white population is exposed, may have functionally high levels of social integration 
(or experience with diminished aspirations) that buffer effects of transitory macro-level social stress and 
economic insecurity. Further, a detailed analysis on subgroups of the white male U.S. population shows 
that in particular low-educated non-married men, i.e. those without a classic form of social integration, 
are at particular risk, confirming Durkheim’s propositions. As possible explanations for this rise we have 
put forward social stress related to economic crisis, economic insecurity, and a realization of diminishing 
opportunities and life chances. Our findings show that the 1955 to 1970 cohorts are, likely due to changes 
in socioeconomic regimes in growth, affected at a particularly vulnerable life stage. This group, if not 
socially protected (integrated) via marriage, is most affected by social stress, resulting in dramatically 
increased suicide rates. As many social observers and political commentators have pointed out, the labor 
market situation in the U.S. of white, lower educated-men is not good, especially relative to what it once 
meant to be a white male in the United States. These men are looking for jobs in an economy that is, from 
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their perspective, increasingly restricted, with many jobs having been transferred to other countries and 
with increasing competition for the few jobs remaining due to the increased labor market participation of 
women of similar ages. This increasing competition has for many men led to lower-paid, lower-valued 
jobs, fewer opportunities for upward mobility, and increased subjective threats to social status. Further 
explanations may be found in the different socialization of the 1960-born cohort compared to earlier and 
later born cohorts, and in the specific impact of the economic crisis on mid-age, when possibilities to start 
over and to gain in income and wealth—or at least to imagine doing same—are lower compared to 
younger ages due to familial and other constraints. What is hopelessness, but the absence of hope? 
Conclusion 
Our study extends earlier findings on mortality and morbidity increases for white non-Hispanic mid-aged 
men with low education (Case & Deaton 2015) by providing a robust test of cohort fluctuations between 
1990 and 2010 with micro-data on suicide rates, resulting in the demonstrations that, first, larger birth 
cohorts face increased risks of dying of suicide. Second, whites entering middle age in 2010 faced 
especially increased risk of dying of suicide if disadvantaged in terms of educational resources. One 
limitation of our study may be the use of five-year intervals when use of yearly intervals would be 
possible; however, the general patterns at issue here are well observable in the time intervals we chose. 
Further, despite rich micro-level indicators of age, gender, education, and race, research on suicide would 
largely benefit from information on religious affiliation (and religiosity) at the individual level, especially 
insofar as considerations of the relative social integration of whites and African-Americans is concerned. 
Another limitation, obviously not resolvable at this point in time, is that we cannot test or forecast how 
the 2010 increase for middle aged white men with low education will evolve over time. As this current 
“epidemic” of rising mortality and morbidity rates (Case & Deaton 2015) is a serious threat to individual 
well-being, and has some ugly implications for societal well-being as well, it will be important moving 
forward to keep an eye on the extent that the phenomenon is transitory (as cohort effects are) or an 
indicator of a more fundamental breakdown of the integration of specific classes of individuals within 
U.S. society. 
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Table 1. Coefficients with Individual-Level Controls for Men. 
 Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. p CI 
Cohort      
1930 0.048 0.017 0.005 0.015 0.081 
1935 -0.059 0.016 0.000 -0.090 -0.029 
1940 -0.134 0.014 0.000 -0.162 -0.106 
1945 -0.042 0.012 0.000 -0.065 -0.019 
1950 0.023 0.011 0.035 0.002 0.044 
1955 0.098 0.010 0.000 0.078 0.118 
1960 0.072 0.010 0.000 0.054 0.091 
1965 0.088 0.009 0.000 0.070 0.106 
1970 0.031 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.049 
1975 0.052 0.010 0.000 0.032 0.072 
1980 -0.053 0.012 0.000 -0.076 -0.030 
1985 -0.124 0.013 0.000 -0.150 -0.099 
Age      
20 -0.117 0.010 0.000 -0.135 -0.098 
25 -0.045 0.009 0.000 -0.062 -0.028 
30 0.013 0.009 0.135 -0.004 0.030 
35 0.042 0.009 0.000 0.024 0.059 
40 0.088 0.009 0.000 0.070 0.107 
45 0.087 0.010 0.000 0.068 0.106 
50 0.081 0.010 0.000 0.061 0.101 
55 0.035 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.056 
60 -0.032 0.011 0.004 -0.054 -0.010 
65 -0.152 0.012 0.000 -0.176 -0.127 
Period      
1990 0.021 0.005 0.000 0.011 0.030 
1995 0.046 0.006 0.000 0.034 0.058 
2000 -0.089 0.007 0.000 -0.102 -0.076 
2005 -0.041 0.006 0.000 -0.053 -0.030 
2010 0.064 0.004 0.000 0.055 0.073 
Cohort (linear) 0.195 0.021 0.000 0.153 0.237 
Age (linear) 0.197 0.011 0.000 0.175 0.220 
High school grad -0.018 0.009 0.048 -0.036 0.000 
Some college -0.751 0.011 0.000 -0.773 -0.730 
College grad  -1.008 0.012 0.000 -1.031 -0.985 
Married -1.001 0.008 0.000 -1.018 -0.985 
Widowed 0.387 0.021 0.000 0.347 0.428 
Divorced 0.076 0.010 0.000 0.057 0.095 
African-American -0.801 0.013 0.000 -0.826 -0.776 
Race: other -0.633 0.019 0.000 -0.671 -0.596 
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Hispanic -0.721 0.012 0.000 -0.744 -0.697 
constant -7.261   0.010 0.000 -7.280 -7.241 
 
Note. Reference group for education is without completed high school; for marital status it is never 
married/single; and for race it is white. 
 
 
Table 2. Coefficients with Individual-Level Controls for Women. 
 Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. p CI 
Cohort      
1930 0.087 0.033 0.007 0.023 0.151 
1935 -0.010 0.029 0.723 -0.068 0.047 
1940 -0.146 0.027 0.000 -0.199 -0.093 
1945 -0.084 0.022 0.000 -0.128 -0.041 
1950 -0.007 0.020 0.733 -0.045 0.032 
1955 0.070 0.019 0.000 0.034 0.107 
1960 0.096 0.018 0.000 0.061 0.131 
1965 0.060 0.018 0.001 0.024 0.095 
1970 0.006 0.019 0.750 -0.032 0.044 
1975 0.054 0.022 0.014 0.011 0.096 
1980 -0.087 0.025 0.001 -0.137 -0.037 
1985 -0.038 0.028 0.177 -0.094 0.017 
Age      
20 -0.423 0.022 0.000 -0.466 -0.380 
25 -0.137 0.019 0.000 -0.175 -0.099 
30 0.093 0.018 0.000 0.057 0.129 
35 0.188 0.018 0.000 0.153 0.223 
40 0.270 0.017 0.000 0.235 0.304 
45 0.250 0.018 0.000 0.215 0.285 
50 0.231 0.019 0.000 0.194 0.267 
55 0.110 0.020 0.000 0.071 0.148 
60 -0.136 0.021 0.000 -0.178 -0.095 
65 -0.445 0.025 0.000 -0.493 -0.397 
Period      
1990 0.078 0.009 0.000 0.060 0.096 
1995 -0.020 0.012 0.096 -0.044 0.004 
2000 -0.106 0.013 0.000 -0.132 -0.081 
2005 -0.038 0.011 0.001 -0.060 -0.017 
2010 0.087 0.008 0.000 0.070 0.103 
Cohort (linear) 0.485 0.041 0.000 0.404 0.565 
Age (linear) 0.397 0.022 0.000 0.354 0.441 
19 
 
High school grad 0.100 0.021 0.000 0.059 0.140 
Some college -0.359 0.022 0.000 -0.403 -0.315 
College grad -0.535 0.024 0.000 -0.582 -0.489 
Married -1.004 0.018 0.000 -1.039 -0.969 
Widowed -0.150 0.030 0.000 -0.209 -0.090 
Divorced 0.002 0.019 0.926 -0.036 0.039 
African-American -1.334 0.028 0.000 -1.388 -1.280 
Race: other -0.514 0.032 0.000 -0.578 -0.451 
Hispanic -1.026 0.027 0.000 -1.078 -0.973 
constant -8.834         0.023     0.000 -8.880 -8.789 
Note. Reference group for education is without completed high school; for marital status it is never 
married/single; and for race it is white. 
 
 
